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1. Introduction
Four decades of radical criticisms against eurocentrism in 
Historical Sociology manifest today through a side effect: the 
allergy to elaborate a more adequate method enabling global 
studies to cope with the multiplex challenges coming from het-
erogeneous geohistorical as well as epistemological standpoints. 
To be sure, the task of placing new methodological cornerstones 
urges, even though it remains inexplicit. For it solicits automatic 
suspicion of neo-positivist «conspiracies» or «neo-colonialism» 
of knowledge whereas scrutinized from postcolonial, decolonial 
or post-Western perspectives. In turn, these same critical per-
spectives do not acknowledge their own inability to steam an 
appropriate methodology out of a pressing demand: to struggle 
against the prejudice that the instances they express are in fact 
exclusively confined to provincial, exotic or solipsistic particu-
larisms, therefore, never as universalistic as the dominant ones. 
Here contradiction arises. that calls for theoretical formulation 
in terms of methodological problem. The problem is enunci-
ated as follows: once agreed upon the world as a single yet 
multi-layered spacetime of analysis, how should research about 
large-scale/long-term processes of social change advance, in order 
to cope with the asymmetrical power relations that materialize 
colonial history through heterarchies of class, gender, race, ethnic-
ity, culture, knowledge, cosmology and ecology? To answer this 
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question, I cope with one particular issue among the many that 
this formulation raises: concept formation. In so doing, I draw 
from my previous researches and scholar exchanges in conceptual 
and terminological analysis (Ascione 2014; 2015; 2016a; 2016b; 
2017; Ascione, Chambers 2016; Ascione, Shahi 2015). The argu-
ment that follows systematizes these findings and proposes new 
pathways for further collective debate. 
The argument develops in four steps. First, it formulates the 
limits of Eurocentrism in terms of methodological issues within 
the social sciences at large; second, it provokes unthinking the 
limits of classical conceptualization in Historical Sociology; third, 
it explores heuristic pathways in postcolonial and decolonial think-
ing; fourth, it formalizes six methodological directives toward a 
new protocol of concept formation for a new global historical 
social sciences to come.
2. Why method, how theory: thinking in an age of transition 
Within Modernity, Eurocentrism was the ideological pillar that 
legitimized the inequalities and the disasters that the capitalist 
mode of production produced globally. Today, after the irruption 
of the pandemic that promises to function as a social regula-
tor for the present future, it becomes clear that Modernity has 
entered a state of extreme insignificance and Eurocentrism has 
entered a state of extreme fragility. Modernity appears an unstable 
construction, either as an era or as an emancipatory ethos. We 
used to think that Modernity had its onset in 1492. Yet, we au-
tomatically accept that this temporal threshold is meaningful only 
ex post, afterwards, for at least three reasons. First, Christopher 
Columbus did not even know that he had landed on a continent 
unknown to European explorers, astronomers, cartographers and 
geographers. Second, the process of colonization took decades 
and decades to reconfigure power and institutions at the global 
scale before culminating with the British Empire overcoming 
the Chinese Empire, after the Opium Wars (1839-1860). Third, 
a geo-culture where Modernity accounted for the dominant 
global ideology to manage European centrality lacked until XIX 
century, when the social sciences were born co-extensively with 
the nation-state. Conversely, the world, synchronically, has come 
to acknowledge that something epochal happened in 2020. An 
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era of transition has begun together with the awareness of such 
a change1. The hallmark of this historical threshold is this: the 
idea that the modern subject, in other words the political idol of 
Scottish, English, French and German Enlightenment, can con-
sciously act upon the present in order to move toward a better 
society, is not a priority anymore. The horizon of Modernity is, 
for the first time, regressive rather than progressive. Therefore, 
political change looks deprived of the participatory and eman-
cipatory ethos that the ideology of the French Revolution had 
transformed into the mythology according to which sovereignty 
belongs to the people (Wallerstein 1999). However, this sudden 
and radical change happens with a very different pace from the 
longue durée that characterize the life-time of the structures of 
knowledge and their inner inertia (Lee 2010). It will take time 
to cope with the partial irrelevance of many of the debates that 
run through these times of transition; nonetheless, it would be 
naïve to cede to the temptation to throwing the baby with the 
bathwater. 
The major issues at stake in the attempt to produce a global 
social science are still there: to elaborate adequate knowledges 
about historical social change; to rethink methodology; to relaunch 
the program of an equal and just society. Such a tension is even 
more challenging than before. For the reaction to the pandemic 
consists in the radicalization of capitalist power, command and 
control: the movement of people is restricted in unprecedented 
ways for sanitarian rules, while capital forces cheap labour to 
stay or to go, where profit and the international division of 
labour needs it to stay or to go. In the realm of explanation, 
colonialism fades out, as if it was a luxury good of theoretical 
consumption even though racial discrimination exacerbates eve-
rywhere across the globe. In the realm of the politics of theory 
and the philosophy of praxis, methodological nationalism strikes 
back, hitting hard against interconnections, transnationalism and 
1 The notion of «Age of Transition» refers to the way World-Systems Analysis 
conceives it, that is, a period of prolonged global structural instability. This notion is 
based on the research about global social change that took place during the decades 
between 1945 and 1990. World-Systems Analysis forecasted that the world will have 
entered the ultimate instability after 2015. Here, instability is not understood in gener-
al terms, rather under specific circumstances and analyzed through four main vectors: 
the interstate system, the accumulation of capital, global inequalities, the structures of 
knowledge. See Hopkins and Wallerstein (1997) and Arrighi (2006).
Gennaro Ascione734
global analysis. Fear makes theory and theorists willing just to 
go metaphorically or materially home into the claustrophobic 
space of the nation-state: its national institutions, its parochial 
disciplinary histories, its abuse of comparative logic, its blind-
ness to constitutive relations, its exclusive linguistic community, 
its belligerent rhetoric, and its deafness to fragile subjectivities.
Methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism are strictly in-
terdependent, being the State the privileged unit of analysis in 
the hegemonic knowledges that legitimized Western dominance 
(Hobson 2012). This methodological hegemony moves in the op-
posite direction than the spread of critical globalization studies 
that animated Sociology and International Relations over the last 
decades (Applebaum, Robinson 2006; Sassen 2005). Eurocentrism 
prescribes that the State is the institution that characterizes the 
West as the single civilization that prompted the most advanced 
form of political organization in History. The latest version of this 
Eurocentric master-narrative articulates in space: it assumes that 
Western institutions were born in modern Europe and spread 
throughout the world allowing different cultures to form so-called 
«multiple modernities» in different geo-historical locations. Or, 
complementarily, the latest version of the same Eurocentric master-
narrative articulates in time: a «late», «advanced» or «second» 
modernity would be on its way (Beck et al. 2004; Eisenstadt 
2006; Macé 2020). This synchronical and diachronical way to 
reframe Western dominance through new attributive features of 
Modernity grounds the assumption that Europe (and by exten-
sion «the West» as hyperreal construction) is prima inter pares2. 
This assumption has been a major focus of criticism in the social 
sciences (Bhambra 2007; Di Meglio 2008). The customary geneal-
ogy of the «global» does not tell the full story of the conflicts 
of ideas in the context of the struggle for the redistribution of 
wealth and the decolonization of knowledge in the second half 
of XX century. The intellectual history of «the global», in fact, 
is always reconstructed in terms of a chronological succession 
of paradigmatic shifts that design a linear incremental trajectory: 
going from the nation-state to the world. Such a sociological 
2 Chakrabarty (2000), drawing from Jean Baudrillard (1991), considers Europe a 
hyperreal entity, a cultural projection and ideological construction that works as if it 
existed in historical reality even though it actually performs no more than a ghostly 
ontological presence in space and time rather than enjoying geohistorical existence as such.
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disciplinary narrative systematically neglects three points. The 
first is that the rise of state-centrism systematically promoted by 
modernization theories was a response to the political challenge 
provoked by the birth of embryonic forms of the decoloniza-
tion of theory in the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War, rather than the latter being a reaction to the mounting 
ideological and theoretical hegemony of the former. The second 
is that the methodological critique elaborated by world-systems 
analysis was coherent with the tradition of American sociology, 
rather than an exception to it, and the latter’s bias (evident 
since the 1960s) to align the theorization of the global with 
the tradition of the Western colonial gaze upon the history of 
the world. The third is that the irruption of the colonial dif-
ference into the realm of theory production since the 1980s is 
responsible for the disentanglement of relationalism from holism 
in methodological thinking about the global (Ascione 2016b). 
Based on this critical acquisition, global social science has to 
move forward and elsewhere now. 
Eurocentrism results still pervasive in social thinking today, 
however from a weaker position. Samir Amin (1988, 166) pro-
vided an early, comprehensive and still working definition of 
Eurocentrism:
Eurocentrism is not, properly speaking, a social theory, which integrates 
various elements into a global and coherent vision of society and history. It 
is rather a prejudice that distorts social theories. It draws from its storehouse 
of components, retaining one or rejecting another according to the ideological 
needs of the moment. 
Two elements stand out in this general definition. First, the 
meta-theoretical level where Eurocentrism locates makes it a para-
digm rather than a theory3. Second, the self-transforming ability 
of Eurocentrism enables it to respond with a sufficient degree 
of flexibility to the push towards changing organizational needs 
that change across changing historical times. The former explains 
why Eurocentrism informs social sciences even if several perspec-
3 Here «meta-theoretical» recalls the original terminology, introduced by David 
Hilbert in 1905 within the realm of the philosophy of science, and further developed 
by Kurt Gödel in 1931 in the realm of formal logic, rather than the conceptual drift 
postmodernism and deconstructionism caused since the late 1970s. Simply put: a me-
ta-theory is a theory whose subject is another theory rather than an element, being it 
within a set of other elements or standing alone.
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tives move radical criticisms against it. The second explains how 
Eurocentrism reshapes its own ideological attributes, in order to 
resurface even in non-Western geo-historical and cultural locations 
through several forms of indigenization of Western theories or 
new allocentric ethnocentrisms. The awareness of the constant 
recombination of these two elements shades light over the central 
theoretical problem at stake: Historical Sociology, Postcolonial 
and Decolonial Studies are very effective in dismantling why 
Eurocentrism raises constant and reiterate challenges to critical 
thinking, and regenerates itself constantly. Yet, they are much 
less effective in elaborating how social sciences should allow 
global studies to cope with multiplex challenges coming from 
heterogeneous geo-historical as well as epistemological standpoints, 
which these three fields of research brought to the forefront of 
theoretical debates as well as empirical research. 
In fact, the globalization of concepts, notions and categories 
modelled upon European history and experiences encounters 
growing limits in its ability to explain, narrate or represent other 
geo-historical contexts and experiences (Burawoy 2005; 2008). 
Yet, between the specific inquiry into concept formation and 
the globalization of Western knowledge there exists a lag that 
remains unexplored. Those who work systematically on the way 
concepts in social science emerge underrate the problem of the 
cross-cultural articulation of existing categories in non-Western 
worlds (Knorr-Cetina 2007; Kontopoulos 1994; Marradi 20007; 
Marradi, Fobert Veutro 2001; Morgan 2014). Those who work 
on non-European knowledges are recalcitrant to move beyond the 
critical discourse over methodology and engage directly with the 
effort to formalize alternative ways to design concepts and assess 
their adequacy (Akiwowo 1988; 1999; Alatas 2006). This is why 
the debate over the methodology of concept formation does not 
go beyond two sharable premises: the constitutive relevance of 
conversations between perspectives that arise in different places 
at different times; the will to work for a common language for 
the social sciences, informed by a common set of values and 
concerns (Outhwaite 1988; Ersche 2014). 
Nevertheless, frontier debates about methodology that explic-
itly cope with non-Eurocentric concept formation take place in 
the disciplinary sub-field of Historical Sociology for International 
Relations. This is because International Relations Theory, more 
than disciplinary Sociology, has become more and more exposed 
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to a global challenge: the shifting equilibrium in global power 
where ideological challenges to the hegemony of the West raise 
from non-Western powers and their structures of knowledge. 
These challenges put mounting pressures on the Western con-
ceptual archive and its adequacy, because they are backed by 
millenarian strong, well-established, studied and respected complex 
philosophical traditions such as Indian, Chinese or Islamic, that 
are not less prestigious than the modern Western or the ancient 
Greek ones. The same reverence does not apply, for instance, 
to indigenous colonial knowledges. Because of such pressures, 
a mounting intellectual move devotes intellectual energies and 
institutional resources to question the hegemony of the strongest 
among the foundational Western assumptions: the strict hierar-
chical determination that moves downwards from ontology to 
epistemology to methodology (Lacatus et al. 2015). During the 
last ten years at least, the debate lives within a well-defined 
system of theoretical coordinates. On the one hand, Patrick 
Jackson (2015) restates the position that Bevir and Kadar (2008) 
safeguard in the field of Political Science. Jackson believes in the 
Cartesian-Kantian philosophical foundations of social science and 
reassert the cogency of the demarcation problem, that is, simply 
put: to establish what is science and what is non-science. For 
him, the ontological positioning of a theory logically precedes 
the construction of theory itself. Thereby, he restricts the realm 
of consistent epistemologies, which, in their turn, allows for a 
limited number of methodological options acceptable as valid. 
On the other hand, Bennett (2015) subverts Jackson’s hierarchy 
of abstraction that descents from ontology to method. Barkin 
(2015) enhances the argument made by Bennett, and suggests 
that, rather than being ascribed to inner properties, epistemo-
logical frameworks are conceivable as relationally constructed, 
and selectively intertwined by multiple methods pragmatically 
mobilized. By looking to this articulation from a global perspec-
tive, the coherence of each framework looks grounded into the 
axiomatization of a restricted number of assumptions that are 
geo-historically determined and thus potentially questionable, 
even though plausible or consuetudinary. Thereby imagining a 
non-ontological space between epistemology and methodology 
where heuristics becomes relatively free. Free to engage with 
non-Western knowledges as it will be explained in the section 4. 
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Any attempt at elaborating a method rather than criticizing 
it solicits automatic suspicion of neo-positivist «conspiracies» or 
«neo-colonialism» of knowledge whereas scrutinized from post-
colonial, decolonial or post-Western perspectives. This allergy to 
method is not unreasonable: it derives its raison d’être from the 
deconstructionist matrix of critical thinking, on the one hand, and 
from the indigenous knowledge genealogy of decolonial thinking, 
on the other hand (Harding 2011; Steinmetz 2013). These two 
reasons converge against the XIX century positivist bias from 
which social science draw its own Western and colonial unilateral 
authority over its own theoretical «Others». 
In turn, these same critical perspectives do not acknowl-
edge their own inability to steam an appropriate methodology 
out of a pressing demand: struggling against the prejudice that 
the instances they express are in fact exclusively confined to 
provincial, exotic or solipsistic particularisms; therefore never 
as universalistic as the dominant ones. Here contradiction arises 
that calls for theoretical formulation in terms of methodologi-
cal problem. The problem can be enunciated as follows: how 
should research about large-scale/long-term processes of social 
change be conducted once agreed upon the world as a single 
yet multi-layered spacetime of analysis, in order to cope with 
the asymmetrical power relations that materialize colonial history 
through heterarchies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, 
knowledge, cosmology and ecology? 
Not all the critiques to Eurocentrism conspire to think glob-
ally. Often they are engaged in a different effort, which consists 
in either recovering and rewriting the histories that Eurocentrism 
had silenced and misrepresented, or allowing marginalized and 
repressed social groups, subjects and knowledges to reshape his-
tory, theory and politics through a new privileged emphasis on 
their formerly excluded voices and experiences (Raj 2013; Fan 
2016). This entire, constantly in-the-making, intellectual planetary 
heritage is indispensable for a non-Eurocentric, non-hegemonic 
global historical social science. Nonetheless, it is not enough. 
Eurocentrism survives in the forma mentis that the social sci-
ences inherited from XIX century sociology, its language and 
its lexicon. Not only because Eurocentrism forces the social 
sciences to select only those histories and experiences that are 
compatible with the need to re-establish, time after time, the 
centrality of the West. Not only because the canonical concepts 
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of the social sciences draw from these experiences and these 
histories, therefore replicating themselves in a circular movement 
that pretends to discover while it is actually confirming its own 
partial and questionable premises. Rather, in the relation between 
histories and concepts. 
Such a movement between histories and experiences, on 
the one hand, and concepts, on the other hand, involves some 
philosophical aspects and some sociological ones. One way to 
grasp the way they interrelate is thinking through the concrete-
abstract movement. Concept formation in global social science 
conjures to let the concrete-abstract movement involve a linguistic 
dimension that sociology had constantly ignored. Sociology has 
confined the problem of other languages in the social sciences 
to the derivative approach that anthropology, ethnic studies, or 
Area Studies, share with comparative linguistics. It has never 
taken seriously the importance of placing linguistic otherness at 
the centre of its theoretical concerns (Connell 2000). Concept 
formation for global social sciences, instead, contends that the 
way concepts are formed through the words that allow the 
social sciences to think the world represents a circumscribable 
task whose relevance hides into the manifold n-dimensional 
space of the sociological imagination. It consists in a rational 
endeavour aiming at transgressing the limits of Western social 
thinking. This rational endeavour focuses on how to think the 
relation between the abstract and the concrete: the more the 
concrete-abstract movement remains an unquestioned part of the 
sociological imagination, the more Eurocentrism keeps operating 
underneath, preventing new ways of thinking to emerge. 
This is why how to form concepts needs to be explained. 
Once made explicit, it needs to be reimagined. Once reimagined, 
its potential can be unleashed in order to explore new pathways 
and finally move toward the formalization of a different meth-
odological approach to conceptualization. 
3. Familiarizing with the methodological unfamiliar 
According to Antonio Gramsci, when freed from evolutionism 
and positivism, the core theoretical problematics of Sociology 
share the same epistemological issues with Political Science. For 
both, however non-coincident forms of knowledge, the elabora-
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tion of concepts and the use of categories relate to a wider 
Weltanschauung (Gramsci 1966, 80), which induce to overlap-
ping methodological questions. In his attempt to systematize the 
methodology of concept formation from the vantage point of 
Political Science, John Gerring (2001) elaborated a framework 
whose quintessential logic perfectly expresses how Eurocentrism 
reproduces itself every time the issue of classification comes to 
the forefront of the social sciences at large. Gerring adopts eight 
broad criteria to assess the adequacy of a concept: familiarity, 
resonance, parsimony, coherence, differentiation, depth, theoreti-
cal utility, and field utility. Yet, he conceives these eight crite-
ria entirely within the horizon of the universal applicability of 
Western notions. He does not consider the problem of scaling 
up geo-culturally, in order to dialogue with other non-Western 
experiences and ideas. All of these eight criteria are question-
able. Yet, for the purpose of the current argument, the criterion 
of «familiarity» is the relevant one because familiarity alludes to 
an intuitive dimension of language and meaning. This dimen-
sion hides beneath what Noam Chomsky (1995) named «deep 
structure», in his paradigm of Transformational Grammar4: two 
interlocutors communicate at the superficial level of peaking but 
the meanings their communication conveys is deeply stratified and 
partly obscure, tacit, abyssal. Communication at deep unspoken 
strata is possible only thanks to an implicit agreement upon 
certain unexpressed rules of engagement and interpretation that 
privilege some intentions over others. Such shared intentions are 
automatically privileged because familiar. 
Familiarity – in fact – operates a double control over the 
possibility to transgress the borders of Eurocentrism or, vice 
versa, to render those borders more porous, in order to allow 
exchange with epistemological «Others». Familiarity establishes 
a temporal boundary and a spatial one. Together, they operate 
jointly an a priori control over whether a concept is adequate 
or not. The temporal boundary consists in a conservative bias. 
According to this bias, there exists a hierarchy between the old 
and the new: the already accepted sounds familiar, the never 
heard results unfamiliar. This guarantees to Western concepts an 
4 In extreme synthesis, Transformational Grammar is a part of the research program 
in Generative Grammar that aims at uncovering the hidden rules of communication and 
meaning in natural languages. 
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automatic comparative advantage. This advantage is not simply 
a historical by-product of academic colonialism as well as of 
epistemological imperialism (Lander 2001). It is a by-product of 
Popperian, falsificationist epistemology that, as Lakatos (1976) and 
Feyerabend (1975) demonstrated in the realm of the philosophy 
of science, resists change even when adequacy appears largely 
compromised. The spatial boundary pertains to the civilizational 
divide. It safeguards the ascribed superiority of the concepts 
elaborated within the Western tradition and its languages, over 
the concepts that belong to other locations and practices. Any 
attempt at using concepts from other languages, traditions, or 
geohistorical locations, produces perturbations and instinctive 
annoyance. The former, temporal boundary, reasserts the episte-
mology of XIX century positivism. The latter, spatial boundary, 
relegates non-Western notions to the exotic territory of cultural 
particularism. 
Once acknowledged, this condition is not easy to overcome. 
It mortifies new forms of conceptualization as far as a narrow 
theoretical imagination is concerned. Things begin to change 
when the social sciences at large think the whole world as the 
privileged unit of analysis. This move to the world as a single 
unit of analysis implies a direct confrontation with the meth-
odological issues raised by Terence K. Hopkins in chapter 7 of 
the collective book entitled World-Systems Analysis Theory and 
Methodology (1982). For World-Systems Analysis is the seminal 
approach to the critique to the hegemony of methodological 
nationalism in global studies. Hopkins introduced the problem 
herewith by exhorting the reader to an intellectual counterintui-
tive detour: «Forcing ourselves to think in ways we are not used 
to…» (Hopkins, 1982: 146). In his dense phrases that are under 
scrutiny here, Hopkins first resumes the usual way Sociology as 
a discipline, as well Historical Sociology as a subfield, thinks 
to concept formation. This way of thinking consists in the rela-
tion that Sociology, the social sciences, and epistemology take 
for granted between the abstract and the concrete. Usually, he 
explains, we move from the level of concept (what is considered 
«the abstract») downward to the level of indicator (what is con-
sidered «the concrete»). Through such a descending movement, 
we include layers of attributes that, one by one, enable us to 
visualize the concrete presence of the object we want to study in 
the real world; finally, we materialize what the abstract concept 
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captures in theory. The opposite, yet complementary, movement 
returns inductively from the indicator upward to the concept, 
by dropping these attributes and sublimating the concrete into 
the abstract. According to this classical sociological view, which 
Hopkins epitomizes with Paul Lazarsfeld, such a vertical double 
movement comes together with a horizontal one. This horizontal 
movement takes place at the level where concepts lay. On such 
an abstract layer, there exist the network of concepts. Hopkins 
invokes Carl Gustav Hempel’s analytical philosophy to figure the 
abstract layer he wants to question: «The imagery of a theory as 
a network of substantive concepts (nodes) and logical relations 
between them (threads), floating, as it were, above a world of 
reality to which the theory is linked by ‘rules of interpretation’» 
(Hopkins 1982, 146). How does Hopkins rethink the concrete-
abstract from here, then? 
A digression is due in order to enter the counterintuitive logic 
in Hopkins’ methodology. According to Hopkins and Wallerstein, 
the only significant unit of analysis for long-term and large-scale 
processes of social change at the global level is the world-system. 
In extreme synthesis, a world-system is a spatiotemporal entity 
whose extension corresponds to the geography of the commod-
ity chains of economic exchange that interconnect the multiple 
places of production into a single integrating «whole». A single 
overwhelming principle of social action rules this whole: in the 
modern world-system, this principle is the endless accumulation 
of capital. What is important to understand is that the world-
system is a whole that enjoys a higher degree of reality than its 
constitutive parts, which, conversely, lose their own significance if 
taken in isolation from the whole. Different world-systems have 
existed in history, yet the capitalist mode of production is the 
only one that covered the entire world, to the point that the 
global world and the modern world-system came to coincide 
when exploration, conquest and colonization where geographi-
cally completed5. Digression ended. 
Now, Hopkins questions the significance of the concept-indicator 
interpretation of the abstract-concrete movement, that is, «the 
5 The year 1902 with the «conquest» of the South Pole marked the beginning of 
the extinction of the terrestrial frontier to conquest from the colonizer’s imagery (see 
Blaut 1993). Yet, The Berlin Conference among the major European imperialist powers 
and the political division of Africa among the imperial European states had de facto 
materialized this process already in 1884-1885.
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inclusion-relations in terms of the part-whole relations» (Hopkins 
1982, 147). The usage of the word «relation» is ambiguous, 
here. We need to go deep into Hopkins’ formulation and make 
it explicit. The word «relation», in the previous textual citation, 
conveys two distinctive meanings within the same short utterance, 
which has the form of an equational sentence6. When coupled 
with «inclusion», the word «relation» designs the abstract level 
where Lazarsfeld’s classical sociological view locates the interaction 
among different concepts in a Hempel-like ontology. Differently 
from this classical view, the second part of the same Hopkins’ 
equational sentence involves an alternative understanding of the 
word «relation»: relation means what makes possible the exist-
ence of the «part-whole» as a single conceptual unit. This means 
that Hopkins extrapolates «relation» from «inclusion-relations» 
in order to stress the autonomy of relation in this particular 
context of conceptualization for sociological thinking. «Relation» 
possesses a stronger ontological status than the two entities that 
it produces in the act of connecting them. Therefore, reading 
Hopkins’s utterance against the grain clarifies the proper loca-
tion of relation in social thinking: not a concept among other 
concepts, but a category of thought: something wider, which 
makes concept formation possible. In Hopkins’ words:
Our acting units or agencies can only be thought of as formed, and continu-
ally re-formed by the relations between them. Perversely, we often think of the 
relations as only going between the end point, the units or the acting agencies, 
as if the latter made the relations instead of the relations making the units. 
Relations, generally, are our figures and acting agencies are our backgrounds. 
At certain points, in conducting the analyses, it is of course indispensable to 
shift about and focus on acting agencies; but I think we too often forget what 
we have done and fail to shift back again (Hopkins 1982, 149).
The part and the whole are ontologically distinct. The whole 
is not the sum of all its parts. Rather, the set of relations, 
which forms and re-forms the parts. Why? First, because even 
though the whole and the parts are inextricably intertwined, the 
whole is prominent over the parts: this is the quintessence of 
holism, not only in World-Systems Analysis. Second, the part is 
not something given, nor an essence, nor something fixed, nor 
existing out there as such: the part is a theoretical process to 
6 A nonverbal phrase that expresses meaning without a predicate.  
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be conceived, defined, named and analysed. The part does not 
relate to being, rather to becoming. Its definition is not static; 
it implies movement. It is not an ontological essence, rather a 
process of historical-social change. As such, the part, which is 
a process in Hopkins’s understanding, cannot be concrete: it is 
abstract. The whole, instead, which consists in the totality, is con-
crete: that is, more concrete than the parts. Therefore, Hopkins 
subverts Lazarsfield’s notion of the abstract-concrete movement. 
Nonetheless, it would be an epistemological error to conceive 
the whole in terms of empirical reality: the concrete (the totality, 
the whole, the world as a unit of analysis) does not refer to the 
«real world»: the concrete is a form of abstraction itself. The 
concrete is abstract too. 
The part-whole directive gives an utterly different set of directions. It says 
to keep moving out by successive determinations, bringing in successive parts 
– themselves abstract processes – in continuous juxtaposition and in this way 
form the whole, which you need for interpreting and explaining the historical 
changes or conditions under examination (Hopkins 1982, 147).  
Operationally, relation is the category that provides the condi-
tion of possibility for thinking the part-whole; semantically, rela-
tion qualifies the hyphen (-) that symbolizes the connection in 
«part-whole». The hyphen herewith calls for further specification 
of what this particular connection expresses. The hyphen can 
signify different kinds of relation. For example, the hyphen in 
the attribute «non-Western» does not express a proper relation. 
Analogously, yet in a different manner, the hyphen in the attribute 
«geo-cultural» does not qualify a relation between geography and 
culture: it couples the two realms in a single one. Instead, the 
hyphen in «part-whole» as well as in «core-periphery» is a matter 
of method. As such, it involves a procedure of conceptualization 
and defines a way to conduct research7. How? 
The relevance of appropriating the deep meaning of the 
relation that the hyphen symbolizes in the concept of core-
periphery has major implications for our ability to look inside 
how notions work and how to form concepts, particularly when 
they are formed by two words that become a single unity. For 
four reasons. First, because terms couple in multiple, different 
7 This methodological stance has been rarely further developed, except by McMi-
chael (2000).
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ways, and each way orients research in one direction or another8. 
Second, because the juxtaposition of words to form concepts is 
a viable path to cope with difference in order to maintain an 
acceptable degree of pluralism whereas a synthetic option would 
irremediably sacrifice meanings9. Third, because the juxtaposition 
of words across multiple cultural, civilizational and linguistic 
borders is a viable path to cope with the spaces of untranslat-
ability10. Forth, because another viable path is to move further 
from juxtaposition and pass from a concept formed by two or 
more words to a single-word synthetic concept expressed with 
still another, different, word. In any case, the words we chose 
to form concepts always become different in sense and meaning 
from those previously used as single term. 
Therefore, for instance, in «world-system», the world con-
notes the whole as historical formation; the system connotes the 
whole as theoretical construct based on its constitutive relations. 
In core-periphery, the core is a socio-economic part where the 
international division of labour locates specific activities such as 
capital concentration or most remunerative segments of produc-
tion, research and development, while the periphery is another 
socio-economic part where the international division of labour 
locates the activities other than the one associated with the core. 
The world-system is a concept that designs the whole, a total-
ity, the unit of analysis. It is more concrete than core-periphery. 
Core-periphery designs a set of processes not entirely reducible 
to a spatial matrix, where the international division of labour 
designs one among the relations between different parts. 
The part of the whole is a process, not an entity existing in 
se and per se. The part is a process that we are called to study 
through an adequately formed concept or set of concepts, whose 
8 For example, there exists a crucial difference between thinking in terms of world 
system rather than to assume the world-system as a unit of analysis, or talking of cen-
ter and periphery, rather than analyzing processes through core-periphery as a singular 
intrinsically relational spacetime (see Wallerstein 1991). Analogously, for the notion of 
core-periphery, see Wallerstein 1979.
9 Grosfoguel’s elaboration on Anibal Quijano’s concept of coloniality is exemplificative 
of this strategy. For Quijano (1991), coloniality originally expressed a complex matrix 
of power in the interstate system, across race and class. For Grosfoguel (2005, 85) the 
colonial matrix is «the entanglement of multiple and heterogeneous hierarchies of sexual, 
political, epistemic, economic spiritual and racial forms of domination and exploitation». 
10 For a general approach to the topic, even though limited to Western modern 
languages, see Cassin (2014).
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formulation does not exclude taxonomical creativity, linguistic 
contamination and cross-cultural dialogue, rather than conceive 
it merely in terms of a region in world economy named India, 
Latin America, Southern Europe, or even Italy. Nor to a notion 
such as class, gender or status group. 
4. From ontology to heuristics: histories, concepts, relation 
Hopkins’ methodological directive enables us to step into an 
epistemological territory where, paradoxically, the elaboration of 
concepts to think the world forces us out of either strict geographi-
cal locations or strict sociological notion. The vertical-horizontal 
architecture of the movement from concept to indicators, that 
Hopkins demonstrated inadequate for global studies, cannot grasp 
the historical processes of global social change. The world as a 
single unit of analysis calls for concepts grounded upon a dif-
ferent sociological imagination as far as the constitutive relation 
between the parts and the whole is concerned. 
This suspension creates an intellectual space of its own. 
Thrown in this alien methodological landscape, the sociological 
imagination experiences an uncanny, fluctuating condition of 
disorientation. Hopkins rescues the reader by invoking Marx. 
Hopkins asserts that the methodological choice he is proposing 
«is the one that Marx discusses in his very brief and elliptical 
remarks on The Method of Political Economy» (Hopkins, 1982: 
147). In the aforementioned brief essay, Marx made explicit that 
the concrete is the synthesis of multiple determinations of the 
relations in which they are seized, in which they participate.
The reader will notice how Hopkins resonates with Marx, 
but also how Hopkins transforms Marx’s notion of society, 
that is, the whole of the relations between humans, into the 
notion of system, that is, the whole of the relations between 
parts11. On his turn, Marx inherited from Hegel the notion of 
integrated totality. For the idealist philosopher Hegel, totality is 
11 It is important to note that single part and a single human do not coincide, 
from a methodological point of view, except in the case of methodological individualism 
such as in the marginalist critique to Marxian political economy. Therefore, Hopkins’ 
methodological shift from society to system provide a useful tool to subsume Coleman’s 
methodological individualism in Sociology rather than dismissing it as irreconcilable 
(Kontopolous 1993, 75-101).
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a metaphysical whole endowed with ontological presence. For 
the materialist social scientist Marx, this whole is society as a 
conceptual construction. For the historical sociologist Hopkins, 
society is meaningless unless we think the world in terms of an 
integrated spacetime co-produced by long-term and large-scale 
processes of social change. This is why Hopkins and Wallerstein 
(1982, 111) affirm that: 
The arena where social action takes place and social change occurs is not 
«society» in the abstract, but a definite «world», a spatiotemporal whole, whose 
spatial scope is coextensive with the elementary division of labor among its 
constituent regions or parts, and whose temporal scope extends for as long 
as the elementary division of labor continually reproduces the «world» as a 
social whole.
Hegel, Marx, Hopkins and Wallerstein assume totality as 
an intrinsic limit of abstraction. The ontological presence of 
totality informs the presumed adequacy of the concepts aiming 
at studying the parts of the whole. Yet, the meaningfulness of 
totality comes at a cost: a theoretical escamotage. Either Hegel, 
or Marx, or Hopkins, or Wallerstein, affirm that the concrete 
is itself abstract, but they keep on deploying the concept of 
abstract-concrete as terminological invariant: they theoretically 
act as if the abstract (the part) would be less concrete than the 
concrete (the whole), even though, in fact, the concrete (the 
whole) is abstract too, however to a lesser degree. There follows 
that the movement toward the concrete, the totality, the whole, 
the system, the world, cannot but be purely asymptotical: it is 
meaningful only if one conceives it in terms of a constant tension 
towards an unknown reality. In other words, the abstract-concrete 
describes the permanent condition of incompleteness wherein the 
continuous transformation involved in historical social change 
can be conceptualized. Therefore, in front of such an awareness, 
the methodological problem of concept formation shifts from 
ontology to heuristics as the researcher, the social scientist is 
fully aware of the transitional heuristic meaning of what is the 
ultimate frontier of epistemological concreteness, which escapes 
any pure ontological essence. 
This shift is crucial. It allows Western thinking to dialogue 
with other knowledges that are not structured in terms of 
hierarchy between ontology, epistemology, and methodology. 
Moreover, this dialogue does not necessitate the complete dis-
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missal of the theoretical tools of the social sciences. Confronted 
with this transformed self-understanding, Western social science 
matures the awareness that the world is not only the geohistori-
cal space that the capitalist world-system came to englobe by 
waves of successive incorporations until it covered the entire 
surface of the planet. The world is also the vast spacetime of 
multiple epistemologies that Eurocentrism had marginalized and 
silenced. The vast majority of these epistemologies co-habited a 
global space that pre-existed the full colonization of the world 
by Europeans at the turn of XIX century. These epistemologies 
continued to exist in recessive forms, regardless of the epistemic 
violence that hegemonic knowledges blatantly materialized against 
their survival12. Theoretically, thus, the «world» of the capitalist 
world-system is one among other parts of the whole, and these 
parts are either regions or processes, but also knowledges whose 
existence interpellate global social science to register them and 
understand their relevance. 
The problem, then, becomes how to explore these parts, 
which had been previously ignored. Three pathways follow from 
here: 1) rethinking the relation between histories and concepts; 
2) thinking the relation between concepts across cultures; 3) 
unthinking the category of relation.
1) How to rethink the relation between concepts and histories? 
Gurminder Bhambra contends that «it is the process of reshaping 
shared narratives in light of what is presented as new data and 
accounting for why it is understood as new that opens up the 
space for further insights about historical and social processes» 
(Bhambra 2014, 150). She problematizes the colonial relations 
of power underlying the criteria for selecting the histories from 
which sociological concepts are formed. Bhambra faces the 
inadequacy of Eurocentric historiographical knowledge devoted 
to long-term and large-scale processes available to sociological 
imagination. She adopts the theoretical strategy that Immanuel 
Wallerstein had adopted since the 1970s when he found in the 
French historian Fernand Braudel new perspectives and materi-
als to source. Her historiographical new point of departure is 
Sanjay Subrahmanyam’s Connected Histories research program. 
Subrahmanyam’s methodological directive consists in assuming 
that the world is full of connections whose existence precedes 
12 On the concept of «epistemic violence» see Spivak (2010).
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the relations that the researcher co-produce when establishes 
that different parts (in the specific epistemological meaning we 
are using it here) are intertwined. Connections are already there, 
and they set the condition of possibility for relations to emerge. 
This pre-condition of pre-existence of connections before relations 
allows, in fact, for the discovery of relations across spaces and 
times, events and processes, actors and structures. According to 
Subrahmanyam (1997, 762): «If we ever get to ‘them’ by means 
other than archaeology, the chances are that it is because they 
are already plugged into some network, some process of circu-
lation». Bhambra transposes Subrahmanyam’s assumption into 
sociological thinking, and enriches its significance by maintaining 
that the approach she baptizes Connected Sociologies «starts from 
a recognition that events are constituted by processes that are 
always broader than the selections that bound events as particu-
lar and specific to their theoretical constructs» (Bhambra 2016, 
347). The methodological option of connectedness in Historical 
Sociology directly interpellates Postcolonial theory, by exposing 
the historical and colonial nature of the asymmetries that run 
along the relations existing between different standpoints, and 
the power differentials that sustain the authority to establish the 
procedures and rules of validation of knowledge. It is important 
to stress that the new data gathered through elaboration and 
measurement, and the new histories retrieved from the silenced 
colonial archive, are equivalent from a strictly epistemological 
point of view. They are both theoretical artifacts13. They both 
put existing concepts in tension. They both serve the purpose 
of spatializing Western concepts14. They both interpellate non-
Western concepts that claim their own adequacy and are able to 
transform the parochial Eurocentric conceptual architecture of the 
social sciences. Thereby, when concepts draw from non-Western, 
indigenous or subaltern Western knowledges, they immediately 
recall the issue of translation. 
2) How to rethink relation between concepts across cultures? 
Here translation is not a strictly linguistic operation, rather a 
cross-cultural dialogue that assumes the single concept as a 
13 On the construction of historical facts see Shapin (1994). For a global and 
anti-Eurocentric assessment of the same problem, see Bala (2006).
14 The notion of spatialized historical concepts draws from Reinhart Koselleck’s 
(2002) practice of conceptual history. Nonetheless, the problem of cross-cultural dialogue 
is absent in Koeselleck’s approach.
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theoretical locus of tension, amongst other civilizational sites of 
negotiation where asymmetries of power materialize in tropoi, or 
even stances, that are transient because historically determined 
(Iveković 2010). Xiaoyong Qi (2014) has analysed some of these 
asymmetries and has paid particular attention to the flows of 
conceptual exchange across the West/East border of global social 
theory. She asserts the relevance of Eastern concepts, mainly 
Chinese, showing the way the vocabulary of the social sciences 
could become, according to her, more adequate to global so-
cial change. For her, the way consists in exploring the spaces 
of non-coincidence between two concepts that would engage 
with the same process. This non-coincidental space, however, is 
not neutral; therefore, the very problem of choosing between 
the two forces to think to two non-reconcilable alternatives. 
Qi maintains that in certain cases, Chinese concepts are not 
only more effective in explaining Chinese social change. Rather, 
she claims universal applicability for them, since «they tend to 
be concrete rather than abstract and sensitive to the relational 
properties of association» (Qi 2014, 2). From a methodological 
vantage point, Qi conceives the reciprocal interpellation among 
concepts across cultures, by reducing the explanatory logic of 
the asymmetries of power in concept formation to ideational 
influence. Influence is a quite fascinating notion in the realm 
of the history of ideas. Particularly when exchanges across civi-
lizational borders are concerned (Goonatilake 1998). Moreover, 
from a historiographical point of view, influence is useful to 
disclose new territories of inquiry that had been previously ig-
nored: influence is a clue in historical investigation that is able 
to uncover hidden historical records. Unfortunately, though, in 
terms of the methodology of concept formation, influence limits 
the inquiry between philological research, on the one hand, and 
thematic analogies, on the other hand, whose outcome consists 
in the struggle for genealogical primacy between civilizations or 
cultures. A struggle whose quintessence consists in competing 
ethnocentrisms, eurocentric versus sinocentric in this case, thereby 
avoiding the systematic approach to cross-cultural translation as 
an explicit tool for conceptualization. Influence is a deflective 
way of characterizing relations (Ascione 2016a). 
Rather, the relevant methodological problem consists in quali-
fying relations between concepts in a different manner. 
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3) How to unthink «relation», then? Decolonial theory of-
fer some frontier insights to this question. In their latest work, 
Mignolo and Walsh (2018, 1) mobilize several non-hegemonic 
knowledges to this conundrum: from the Andean region to an-
cient Persia, they explores concepts that help to overcome the 
limits of the Western heuristics of relationality. They rediscover 
the notion, in Spanish language, of vincularidad. For them, 
Vincularidad is the awareness of the integral relation and interdependence 
amongst all living organisms (in which humans are only a part) with territory 
or land and the cosmos. It is a relation and interdependence in search of 
balance and harmony of life in the planet. As such, vincularidad/relationality 
unsettles the singular authoritativeness and universal character typically assumed 
and portrayed in academic thought. Relationality/vincularidad seeks connections 
and correlations.  
Here «relationality and/or vincularidad» expresses a heuristic 
approach that is different from the way we have graphically 
expressed relation through the hyphen symbol. The slash here 
signifies a juxtaposition that does not form a new single concept 
out of the two words used, rather it designs a space where the 
two concepts used overlap but, at the same time, it leaves open 
two distinctive paths emanating from each of them. The slash, 
here, powerfully symbolizes the colonial border that separates 
and connect different logics that are not mutually exclusive, yet 
never coincident nor symmetrical15. «Relationality» refers to the 
Western conceptual archive. Vincularidad conjoins either indigenous 
knowledge, or the Spanish colonial idiom, or the constellation 
of marginalized Renaissance pantheistic knowledge; these three 
are all forms of knowledges, (parts, in the methodological terms 
elaborated throughout this entire argument), which became sub-
altern during modernity. Indigenous knowledge about the planet 
were, and still are, destroyed or relegated to primitive ecological 
phantasies. English overcome the Spanish language. «Vinculum» 
disappeared as a word and as a category: Latin, that was the 
dominant language of Science, became obsolete; the gnoseological 
world behind the transformation of the Aristotelian notion of 
relation into the pantheistic notion of vinculum was destroyed 
15 Border thinking as a gnoseological strategy was developed first by Mignolo 
(2000) on the base of the analysis of the different linguistic languages colonial, Marxist 
and indigenous used in their rhetoric by the Zapatistas in Mexico during the 1990s. 
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in Europe by the interplay of three powerful ideologies: the 
Reformation, the Counter-Reformation, and the scientific method 
(Ascione 2020). 
Vincularidad expands relationality and transforms the latter 
in something other than what the hegemonic modern knowledge 
made us familiar with. It involves the idea of the world as an 
integrated living organism rather than a systemic whole governed 
by the overwhelming singular logic of the accumulation of capital. 
Methodologically, relation/vinculum invokes enhanced translation 
strategies across languages and logics that are able to enrich 
the conceptual lexicon available to the social sciences. For this 
reason, let us follow Mignolo and Walsh (2018: 166) traveling 
from ancient Persian language to Andean Kechua, through the 
noun «Runa». 
Runa was and still is conceived in relation to and in convivencia (a literal 
translation would be «living-with-other-living-organisms», but the term is gene-
rally translated as «coexistence» or «conviviality») with huacas (deities, entities 
of the sacred sphere), sallqa (all living organisms), and the Apu (the tutelary 
spirit that inhabits the snowed peaks of the mountains). These organisms are 
all weaved together, for the metaphor of tejido (weaving) is commonly invoked 
to express convivencia and vincularidad (translated as «relationality») (Mignolo, 
Walsh 2018, 166). 
The lexicographic movement described herewith could ap-
pear a circular one: from relationality to vincularidad back 
to relationality. Yet, relationality we come up with after this 
process of elaboration results different; it is augmented by the 
exploration into the semantic field inhabited by the tensions 
that translation enhances. Mignolo and Walsh provide a strong 
case for applying a more articulated formulation of the issue 
of cross-cultural translation in methodological terms. Such a 
formulation has developed during the last forty years, beneath 
the surface of the steady crystallization of the dichotomy staged 
by eurocentric hegemonic knowledges, on the one hand, and 
their counter-part, which Wallerstein (1997) brilliantly baptized 
«eurocentric anti-eurocentrism». 
Such a more articulated cross-cultural translation of con-
cepts remains invisible to most of the social sciences, while it 
is more immediately urgent in the field of the sociology of law. 
Here human rights as well as indigenous rights continuously 
incur in definitional impasses that call for taxonomic solutions 
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since concepts serve the need to codify processes, groups and 
conditions, through particular words that candidate to become 
cornerstones for building jurisdictional architectures that inform 
the life and histories of existing human beings. Often, in the 
modern multicultural states of the postcolonial world shaped by 
global migrations, cultural identity is framed in religious terms 
that condition identity politics, citizenship, socioeconomic condi-
tions and cultural mediation. This is where the social sciences 
interface with the theory of inter-religious dialogue. For this 
reason, Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s decolonial option in the 
sociology of law is methodologically relevant.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos explains that the process of 
exchange involves concepts across knowledges and cultures16. 
A diatopical hermeneutics is based on the idea that the topoi of an indi-
vidual culture, no matter how strong they may be, are as incomplete as the 
culture itself. Such incompleteness is not visible from inside the culture itself, 
since aspiration to the totality induces taking pars pro toto. The objective of 
a diatopical hermeneutics is, therefore, not to achieve completeness – that 
being an unachievable goal – but, on the contrary, to raise consciousness of 
reciprocal incompleteness to its possible maximum engaging in the dialogue, 
as it were with one foot in one culture and the other in another, accounting 
for its diatopical character. A diatopical hermeneutics requires not only a dif-
ferent kind of knowledge, but also a different process of knowledge creation. 
It requires the production of a collective and participatory knowledge based 
on equal cognitive and emotional exchanges, a knowledge-as-emancipation rather 
than knowledge-as-regulation [Italics added] (Sousa Santos 2002, 48).
This proposal expresses a sharable commitment and formulates 
it in explicit manner. Nonetheless, the very last phrase in italics 
raises disagreement from a methodological point of view: it is 
not necessarily true that knowledge-as-regulation is alternative 
to knowledge-as-emancipation. Surely, it is true that the effort 
toward the elaboration of new concepts through cross-cultural 
dialogue requires participatory knowledge based on equality. Yet, 
16 De Sousa Santos appropriates diatopic hermeneutics from theologian Raimon 
Panikkar to cope with issues of space. Analogously, Immanuel Wallerstein appropriated 
the notion of Kairos from the theologian Paul Tillich, to cope with issues of time (see 
Wallerstein 2001, 155). Panikkar calls it «Diatopical hermeneutics because the distance 
to be overcome is not merely temporal, within one broad tradition, but the gap existing 
between two human topoi, ‘places’ of understanding and self-understanding, between two 
– or more – cultures that have not developed their patterns of intelligibility. Diatopical 
hermeneutics stands for the thematic consideration of understanding the other without 
assuming that the other has the same basic self-understanding» (Panikkar 1979, 49).
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regulation is the theoretical and political space where methodology 
intervenes. Regulation is precisely where the collective ability to 
create the conditions for conceptualization moves global social 
sciences towards equality, whereas equality is an objective to 
reach and not the illusory premise of European Enlightenment 
that hides the colonial eurocentric history of the modern capital-
ist world, which is the cause for global inequalities (Chakrabarty 
2000). Making explicit the rules that regulate concept forma-
tion aims at rendering these rules openly debatable rather than 
leaving concepts free to fluctuate across unequal cross-cultural 
tropoi whose power differentials mortify emancipatory theory 
and practice a priori. The attempt at formalizing a method for 
concept formation does not mean to occlude thinking. It means 
placing a milestone along a route to trace collectively while walk-
ing by rather than placing a tombstone in the cemetery where 
the myriad of epistemic genocides of Modernity rest in anger.  
5. Formalization: six procedural directives
Formalization, in this specific case, expresses the will to articulate 
a protocol of concept formation that enables active engagement 
with the process of deforming, informing and transforming exist-
ing notions for the social sciences or to creating concepts anew. 
Formalization, at this stage, involves six procedural directives. 
1) The first procedural directive is genealogical. It pertains to 
the possibility of extending in space and time the genealogy of a 
concept. It sets out to produce a global cross-genealogy oriented 
to look into other civilizational and cultural conceptual archives. 
The aim is to find out if and how analogous conceptions exist 
and in what way they differ from those elaborated within Euro-
pean knowledge. This terminological analysis will put particular 
emphasis on the processes of construction and marginalization of 
otherness – that is, whatever does not conform to the colonizer’s 
image of the world – which lies at the foundation of European-
born notions. Its specific scope is to create a porous semantic 
field that works as a premise for the reciprocal interpellation 
of concepts across cultures, which allows alternative narratives, 
histories and experiences, rather than analysing the way notions 
relates or differ from each other. 
The unbearable lightness of method 755
2) Following such a global cross-genealogy, the second direc-
tive is more strictly semantic. It consists in resignification. Resig-
nification alludes to a specific semiotic process, where concepts 
are lifted from their usual contexts and relocated within new 
realms of understanding. This strategy opens up new paths to 
sociological imagination and, at the same time, it calls for further 
interventions to clarify and outline the aim and adequacy of such 
proposed semantic slippages, overlapping, and coming to terms 
with the discrepancies between ongoing global transformations 
and the provincial existing vocabulary devoted to their under-
standing. For example, the attempt at using Asia or Border as 
method, exemplifies this path.  
3) The third directive is epistemological. It consists in recon-
ceptualization. It is the main, most synthetic and complex pro-
cedural directive. Reconceptualization can be oriented to enlarge 
the connotative space of the term as well as the historical-social 
dimensions it can legitimately claim to be referring to. Nonethe-
less, it should be noted, reconceptualization does not necessarily 
ends up in an incremental path. In fact, concepts can also re-
sult disempowered from reconceptualization and their adequacy, 
meaningfulness and scope, therefore reduced. 
4) The fourth directive is taxonomic. Taxonomy, most of the 
times, is evitable. Unfortunately, very often, social theory indulges 
in taxonomy because of the pressures that capitalism puts on 
concept formation in the attempt to transform conceptualiza-
tion in the production of academic branded terms to be sold, 
bought, grabbed, consumed, or imposed, by the global market of 
scientific idea, academic fashions, and intellectualistic simulacra. 
Nonetheless, when useful, taxonomy remains the most creative 
part in concept formation for the social sciences. 
When resignification, reconceptualization or taxonomy result 
effective, the objective of transforming and improving the con-
ceptual vocabulary of the social sciences is achievable; in this 
case, the possible reiteration of the new meaning or concept 
through theoretical praxis relatively stabilizes relevance and 
multiplies usages, disclosing new and unforeseen paths. Then, 
the collective use of concepts through research and teaching 
produces canonization of the associated notions. Whereas, instead, 
resignification or reconceptualization are not possible or effective, 
and taxonomical intervention is not even an option, there results 
that the concept in question does not return to the status of 
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legitimation it had before undergoing these procedures. It may 
appear increasingly inadequate and obsolete. 
5) Therefore, the fifth directive is dismissal. It relates to 
philology as a powerful politics of theory. Inadequacy and ob-
solescence need to be motivated through thought and debatable 
rationales as much as adequacy does. Moreover, the changing 
linguistic, political and historical context for why inadequacy 
and obsolesce occur needs to be explained and the rationales 
argued, so that the concept can be accurately stored: in the 
future, obsolescence and inadequacy can become anachronism, 
and anachronism may transform into a new, renewed or different 
adequacy in another spacetime responding to other organiza-
tional needs. This thoughtful dismissal contributes to construct 
a conceptual archive other than the Eurocentric conceptual ar-
chive we inherited. The conceptual archive of the global social 
science will belong to all the different subjectivities and forms 
of knowledge that had participated in its collective process of 
knowledge production, with their respective understanding but 
also reciprocal irreducibility. 
6) There follows that the sixth directive consists in living 
with untranslatability. It relates to communication in its deepest 
sense. It means assuming the working hypothesis that not always 
translation is possible. Nonetheless, an equally cogent working 
hypothesis complements untranslatability: it consists in the as-
sumption that, instead, communication is always possible. Even 
when conversation terminates in a cul-de-sac and exchange mate-
rializes in nothing but a pneumatic vacuum. For even when the 
space of impossibility speaks the language of conceptual silence 
whereas worded concepts are expected to talk the language of 
reciprocal understanding, communication is not interrupted. It 
is just suspended: an interlocutory pause of indeterminacy or a 
silence to be accurately registered in the uninterrupted dialogue 
that flows among humans across the secret routes of the long-
term and large-scale processes of planetary knowledge formation. 
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The unbearable lightness of method. Concept formation in global 
social science
Four decades of radical criticisms against eurocentrism in historical 
sociology manifest today through a side effect: the allergy to elaborate 
a more adequate method enabling global studies to cope with multiplex 
challenges coming from heterogeneous geohistorical as well as epistemo-
logical standpoints. To be sure, the task of placing new methodological 
cornerstones urges, even though it remains inexplicit. For it solicits 
automatic suspicion of neo-positivist «conspiracies» or «neo-colonialism» 
of knowledge whereas scrutinized from postcolonial, decolonial or post-
Western perspectives. In turn, these same critical perspectives do not 
acknowledge their own inability to steam an appropriate methodology 
out of a pressing demand: struggling against the prejudice that the 
instances they express are in fact exclusively confined to provincial, 
exotic or solipsistic particularisms; therefore never as universalistic as 
the dominant ones. Here contradiction arises that calls for theoreti-
cal formulation in terms of methodological problem. The problem is 
enunciated as follows: how should research about large-scale/long-term 
processes of social change be conducted once agreed upon the world 
as a single yet multi-layered spacetime of analysis, in order to cope 
with the asymmetrical power relations that materialize colonial history 
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through heterarchies of class, gender, race, ethnicity, culture, knowledge, 
cosmology and ecology? To answer this question, the paper herewith 
faces one major issue among the many this formulation raises: concept 
formation. The argument develops in four steps: formulating the limits 
of Eurocentrism in terms of methodological issues within the social 
sciences at large; unthinking conceptualization in historical sociology; 
exploring heuristic pathways in postcolonial and decolonial thinking; 
formalize six methodological directions toward a protocol of concept 
formation for global social sciences. 
Keywords: methodology, concept formation, eurocentrism, decolonial, 
world-system.
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